The Thucydides Trap: A Western Paradigm
Why China’s Strategic Culture Does Not Align with Western Conceptions of Power Dynamics
The “Thucydides Trap,” a term popularized by American political scientist Graham Allison, a professor at Harvard University, in his book Destined for War (2017), refers to a historical pattern in which a rising power challenges an established hegemon, often leading to war. The concept is rooted in Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War in The History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides, an Athenian historian and military general (c. 460–400 BC), chronicled the conflict between the Greek city-states, in which a rising Athens challenged the dominant power, Sparta. He famously observed that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.”
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Since Allison’s introduction of the term, it has been widely applied in Western discourse to project contemporary developments in the relationship between the “established hegemon,” the United States, and the “rising power,” China, particularly in terms of global influence and economic and military power.
In a broader sense, Allison’s concept suggests that wars often occur even when no actor explicitly seeks them; instead, conflict emerges from evolving geopolitical, geo-economic, and security dynamics. A historical parallel can be found in World War I. At the beginning of the twentieth century, no major power publicly advocated for war, yet a series of incidents within a highly charged geopolitical environment—most notably the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in 1914—triggered a catastrophic conflict. World War I became a devastating theater of war in Europe, resulting in an estimated 15–20 million deaths and the collapse of centuries-old dynastic powers, including the Habsburg, Ottoman, Hohenzollern, and Romanov dynasties.
Allison’s case study includes sixteen historical instances of an emerging power rivaling an established one, twelve of which ended in war. Notably, the majority of these cases involve rivalries among powers rooted in European cultural contexts—predominantly Germanic, Anglo-Saxon, and Latin. One major exception in Allison’s dataset is Japan, whose rise in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries culminated in devastating expansionist wars across Asia, including conflicts with China and Russia. The widespread and largely uncritical adoption of the Thucydides Trap paradigm in interpreting the evolution of US–China power relations is inherently Western in its assumptions about power transitions, competition, and the inevitability of conflict. Implicitly, it presumes the universality of this paradigm.
This presumption is grounded in Western history, during which global power struggles and hegemonic transitions were primarily shaped by states emerging from European cultural and historical backgrounds. China represents the first major power in modern history to attain significant global influence, economic weight, and defense capabilities from a fundamentally different civilizational context. The Thucydides Trap paradigm is foreign to Chinese culture, philosophical traditions, and strategic thinking, and it misrepresents China’s historical experiences and approaches to power projection.
In line with other essays in the “culture lens” series in China21 Journal, this essay employs Fons Trompenaars’ model of national culture—widely recognized in international business studies—to develop a more nuanced understanding of why the Thucydides Trap paradigm does not align with Chinese thought, historical experience, or philosophical tradition, all of which tend to emphasize strategic adaptability and balance rather than direct confrontation.
Trompenaars’ model of national culture identifies seven key dimensions along which cultural perspectives differ: Universalism versus Particularism; Individualism versus Communitarianism; Neutral versus Affective; Specific versus Diffuse; Achievement versus Ascription; Sequential versus Synchronic; and Internal versus External Control.
Although each dimension is framed as a contrast between two poles, they should not be interpreted as rigid dichotomies. Cultures exist along a continuum within each dimension, and a culture’s relative position reflects its prevailing or default orientation. Importantly, individuals within a given culture are generally aware that others may operate from different starting points, and in certain contexts may consciously adopt perspectives that diverge from their cultural norm.
For a more in-depth exploration about China’s distinctive cultural patterns and thought in relation to European cultures, the book Has China Devised a Superior Path to Wealth Creation? The Role of Secular Values (2021, Hampden-Turner, Peverelli & Trompenaars) offers a comprehensive analysis through the lens of Trompenaars’ cultural dimensions model.
The Thucydides Trap and Western Realism
The Thucydides Trap is deeply rooted in Western political thought, particularly within the realist school of international relations, which conceptualizes global politics as a struggle for power in a fundamentally zero-sum system (Mearsheimer, 2001). From this perspective, power transitions are inherently destabilizing, as the dominant power inevitably perceives the rise of a challenger as an existential threat. Europe’s historical experience—marked by recurrent wars driven by shifts in the balance of power, such as the Napoleonic Wars and the two World Wars—has reinforced this worldview.
Dominant Western cultures, characterized by a universalist orientation, tend to envision an ideal international order based on fixed and universally applicable rules—hence the notion of a “rules-based world order.” Western societies also score highly specific on Trompenaars’ specific–diffuse dimension. When engaging with a particular issue, attention is focused narrowly and intensively on that issue, often at the expense of its broader relational or contextual dimensions. Viewed through the lens of the Thucydides Trap, these universalist and specific cultural orientations can be illustrated schematically in following matrix.
From a Western perspective, a genuinely peaceful world rests on universally recognized rules. These rules are negotiated sequentially, one issue at a time, and once agreement is reached, further discussion is often seen as unnecessary—or even undesirable. Many global institutions, including the United Nations and its various agencies, are conceived and structured on this logic.
This construction of global order, however, has been faltering for some time. An increasing number of non-Western nations have come to the conclusion that adherence to Western models neither guarantees prosperity nor ensures peace. When European colonies gradually gained independence, many adopted the political systems of their former colonizers as the foundation of nation-building. In most cases, this approach produced mixed or disappointing results—an outcome that, paradoxically, reinforced Western perceptions of cultural superiority. Only more recently have some non-Western societies begun to move away from inherited Western frameworks and seek renewal based on their own cultural values. China stands out in this context as the first non-Western civilization-state to join the ranks of the world’s leading economies without adopting Western political or developmental models.
Most non-Western societies occupy positions at the opposite ends of the universalism–particularism and specific–diffuse cultural dimensions. Rather than concentrating primarily on narrowly defined issues, they tend to prioritize the cultivation of broader, more diffuse relationships. This applies not only at the individual and group levels, but also at the level of states. When American envoys visit a non-Western country, they are typically received with great formality and deference, reflecting the United States’ status as a dominant economic and military power. When China’s foreign minister visits the same country, the reception may be equally official but is often marked by a more cordial tone, particularly in ceremonial settings. In such contexts, the United States is often perceived as a generic partner, while China is approached as a more specific and relational one.
This divergence in perspective is further shaped by a linear conception of history prevalent in Western thought, in which power struggles are seen as inevitable forces driving historical progress. Western historiography frequently interprets history as a succession of conflicts determining which civilization prevails. Consequently, when Western analysts observe China’s rise, they tend to project these historical patterns onto it, assuming that China must either confront or ultimately overturn the existing global order.
The Chinese Perspective: Balance, Adaptation, and Stability
Chinese philosophical traditions—rooted in Confucianism, Daoism, and Sun Tzu’s strategic thought—offer an alternative worldview that does not align with the Thucydides Trap paradigm. Unlike the Western emphasis on conflict as a primary means of resolving disputes and determining power hierarchies, Chinese thought prioritizes harmony (和, hé), balance, and the management of tensions rather than their outright resolution through war.
Confucianism, which has historically informed Chinese governance and diplomacy, emphasizes hierarchical stability, moral leadership, and interdependence (Kang, 2009). It advocates an order sustained not through direct competition, but through relational governance and reciprocal obligations. This stands in contrast to the Western assumption that rising powers must inevitably challenge established ones.
Daoism, with its emphasis on adaptability and natural balance, further reinforces this perspective. The Daoist concept of wu wei (无为), often translated as non-interference or effortless action, suggests that effective leadership lies in subtly guiding events rather than forcing outcomes through direct confrontation. This principle is reflected in China’s historical preference for diplomacy, tributary relationships, and economic integration over outright military conflict.
Sun Tzu’s The Art of War similarly argues that the highest form of strategy is to prevail without fighting (不战而胜, bù zhàn ér shèng) (Sun Tzu, 5th century BCE). In contrast to the Western fixation on decisive battles and total victory, Chinese strategic thought values patience, indirect influence, and long-term positioning in order to avoid unnecessary conflict. This approach has been evident in China’s historical management of power dynamics, including its dealings with the Mongols, the integration of nomadic groups, and the functioning of regional tributary systems.
This difference can be further illustrated through a matrix combining the individualism–communitarianism and specific–diffuse cultural dimensions. In the Western perception, states pursue largely individual national goals. As these goals frequently overlap, collisions are common—ranging from diplomatic friction to armed conflict. While war is generally not the preferred means of conflict resolution, states maintain powerful militaries to signal strength and deter potential adversaries. Once war erupts, however, it can rapidly escalate into large-scale conflict and, at times, even world war.
This matrix is closely linked to the previous one. The Western preoccupation with hegemony legitimizes the maintenance of powerful armed forces, supported by an equally powerful narrative of universal truth that must be defended by all available means. In contrast, non-Western perspectives tend to emphasize networks of diffuse alliances, within which states interact on specific issues. The preservation of the network itself—rather than dominance within it—constitutes the core strategic objective. While such states also maintain militaries, these are primarily intended for particular defensive contingencies within the network. As a result, armed conflicts in this cultural context tend to be smaller in scale and shorter in duration, reflecting an underlying paradigm oriented toward the long-term, ‘inevitable’ reality of coexistence rather than the temporary illusion of complete dominance.
Other cultural dimensions influencing the paradigm gap
Beyond the cultural dimensions of Universalism–Particularism, Individualism–Communitarianism, and Specific–Diffuse, several other dimensions play a significant role in explaining why China does not align with the Thucydides Trap paradigm.
Achievement vs. Ascription: Western cultures tend to emphasize achievement, where power, legitimacy, and status are earned through competition and demonstrable success. This orientation reinforces a worldview in which a rising power must validate its position by overtaking or displacing the existing hegemon. By contrast, China’s cultural orientation leans more toward ascription, valuing historical continuity, inherited status, and civilizational legitimacy. Within this framework, China’s rise is interpreted less as an aggressive bid for dominance and more as a restoration of historical influence.
Neutral vs. Affective Communication: In international relations, Western actors often adopt a more affective communication style, expressing intentions explicitly and engaging in open competition. This aligns closely with the Thucydides Trap’s emphasis on direct rivalry and visible confrontation. China, by contrast, generally operates within a neutral communication style, where diplomacy tends to be subtle, indirect, and calibrated toward maintaining long-term balance rather than provoking immediate confrontation.
Applying Trompenaars’ model in this way makes clear that the Thucydides Trap is a product of Western intellectual traditions. It is built upon assumptions of rule-bound competition, individualistic rivalry, and explicit power struggles—assumptions that do not correspond with Chinese strategic culture, historical experience, or philosophical approaches to power.
Historic comparisons
Vietnam (1950s–1970s): America’s Role versus China’s Role
A revealing historical comparison emerges from the respective roles of the United States and China in Vietnam during the 1950s–1970s. During Vietnam’s struggle for independence from French colonial rule, the United States interpreted Vietnamese nationalism primarily through the prism of the global Cold War. Vietnam’s geographical proximity to China—referred to in Washington at the time as “Communist China”—reinforced the perception that Vietnam’s independence movement constituted a strategic threat rather than a process of decolonization.
As a result, the United States deployed substantial military forces and weaponry to the region. What began as limited involvement gradually escalated into a large-scale war that extended into Cambodia and Laos. The human cost was staggering: over 58,000 American fatalities; approximately two million Vietnamese civilians killed; more than one million North Vietnamese soldiers; and over 200,000 South Vietnamese soldiers. The war triggered widespread global protests and profoundly affected the political landscapes of Western allies. Ultimately, it ended in a comprehensive military and strategic defeat for the United States.
China, by contrast, consistently supported Vietnam’s independence struggle. However, tensions later emerged over divergent views on the development of Cambodia. In February 1979, when Vietnam invaded Cambodia to overthrow the ruling regime, China responded by launching a military incursion along the Vietnamese border. This action compelled Vietnam to redeploy part of its forces from Cambodia to protect Hanoi. China subsequently withdrew its troops the following month.
In the aftermath of this conflict, China and Vietnam gradually normalized relations and developed strong trade partnerships. Despite ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea, these disagreements have not escalated into armed conflict, nor have they derailed the implementation of bilateral economic and diplomatic agreements. The episode illustrates a pattern of limited confrontation followed by stabilization rather than prolonged escalation.
Other historic examples
China’s broader historical experience further demonstrates that power transitions do not necessarily culminate in large-scale or systemic violence. Unlike the European tradition of hegemonic wars, China has frequently managed shifts in power through diplomatic accommodation, economic integration, and institutional continuity.
The Tributary System: For centuries, China maintained its central position in East Asia not primarily through military conquest, but through a tributary system in which neighboring states acknowledged China’s cultural and political primacy in exchange for access to trade, security, and regional stability. This system emphasized hierarchical harmony and mutual benefit rather than coercion or constant warfare.
The Qing Dynasty’s Rise to Power: The Manchu-led Qing dynasty replaced the Ming dynasty in the seventeenth century through a combination of military action, political compromise, and cultural adaptation. Rather than dismantling Han Chinese institutions, the Qing incorporated Confucian governance practices to legitimize their rule. Power transition was achieved through absorption and continuity, not wholesale destruction.
Modern Economic Rise: China’s contemporary rise has likewise been characterized more by economic engagement than by military expansion. In contrast to many historical Western powers, which extended influence through colonization and armed intervention, China has relied primarily on trade, investment, and infrastructure development—most notably through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). At the same time, China’s communist ideological foundation has been diffused and ascribing over time, incorporating evolving thoughts from successive leaders as well as historical experience and cultural legacy. It constantly adapts to particular circumstances and developments, with Chinese characteristics.
Taken together, these historical examples underscore the sharp contrast between China’s approach to power transitions and the Western Thucydides Trap paradigm.
The Misapplication of the Thucydides Trap to US-China Relations
The assumption that US–China relations are inevitably headed for conflict overlooks fundamental differences in worldview and strategic culture. Unlike historical Western powers, which often sought to replace existing hegemonic structures, China’s rise has been characterized by integration into the global economic system rather than a direct confrontation with it. China’s approach to power prioritizes national rejuvenation and stability, not the overthrow of the United States.
Moreover, the US–China relationship is deeply interdependent, particularly in trade, technology, and global governance. The realist assumption that competition necessarily escalates to war fails to capture the complex and interconnected realities of the modern world, where economic interests, strategic cooperation, and mutual survival often take precedence over military confrontation.
Conclusions
The Thucydides Trap, as a Western concept, is grounded in historical patterns of power transitions within the European cultural and historical context, where competing powers are often entangled in zero-sum dynamics and prone to perceiving conflict as inevitable.
A striking—and increasingly extreme—illustration of this paradigm can be seen in the EU’s current approach toward Russia. Brussels, together with NATO leadership, appears to prepare Europe both mentally and materially for the prospect of war, fearmongering a Russian attack on the EU or NATO as practically ‘inevitable’. This approach reflects extreme positions along key cultural dimensions: on the specific end of the specific–diffuse spectrum, it neglects and even bans historical context, nuance, and alternative perspectives, resulting in rigid and often delusional projections. On the universalism end of the universalism–particularism spectrum, it loudly asserts universal rules and values—even when the particular circumstances at hand require tailored, context-sensitive solutions—exposing hypocricy and inconsistencies in actual policy.
Although power projection concerns spheres of influence among all states, the Thucydides Trap paradigm is incompatible with Chinese strategic thought and historical experience, which emphasize balance, adaptive strategy, and long-term stability over direct confrontation. Applying the Thucydides Trap to US–China—or even China–EU—relations risks misinterpreting China’s intentions and mismanaging policy based on flawed assumptions. A more accurate approach requires recognizing China’s distinct worldview, which prioritizes coexistence, diplomacy, and economic interdependence as means of influence rather than inevitable conflict.
As the Daoist philosopher Laozi (traditionally 6th century BCE) reminds us, “The soft overcomes the hard; the weak overcomes the strong” (柔弱胜刚强, róu ruò shèng gāng qiáng), encapsulating the enduring Chinese approach to strategy and power in balance and harmony.
December 20, 2025
Peter Peverelli
Gordon Dumoulin
Featured image: AI generated image by perchance
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Fantastic article Gordon.
It’s a pity that Allison distorts Thucydides’ History, and, instead of exploring the narrative of failed diplomacy, political narcissism and the like, leads discussants down a simplistic and irresponsible path. There’s much to learn from Thucydides, but American political science isn’t where I would start.